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abstract
One of the most influential ideas of twentieth-century art history and aesthetics is that vision has a history and it is the task of
art history to trace how vision has changed. This claim has recently been attacked for both empirical and conceptual reasons.
My aim is to argue for a new version of the history of vision claim: if visual attention has a history, then vision also has a
history. And we have some reason to think that at least in certain contexts (namely, in the context of looking at pictures),
visual attention does have a history.
i. introduction
According to an influential viewwithin art history,
the way the ancient Greeks saw the world was im-
portantly different from the way we now see the
world, and part of what art history should study
is exactly how human vision has changed in the
course of history. If the ancients did see the world
differently from the way we do now, then in order
to understand and evaluate their art, we need to
understand how they perceived it (and how this is
related to theway they perceived theworld). Thus,
so the argument goes, the history of vision is a nec-
essary precursor to art history. This general line of
argument goes back at least as far as Tacitus, but
it became one of the most important premises of
art history and aesthetics from the early twentieth
century.1
The general idea that vision has a history, how-
ever, has been severely criticized recently, both for
empirical and for conceptual reasons. The aim of
this article is to defend a new version of the history
of vision claim from these recent attacks. The up-
shot ofmy argument is that if visual attention has a
history, then vision has a history, and wemay have
strong (but not necessarily conclusive) reasons to
believe that visual attention has a history.
ii. the history of vision claim
The general idea behind the history of vision claim
is that visual experience changes in various ways
in the course of history. We should, therefore, not
assume that people in ancient or medieval times
perceived in the same way as we do now. Further,
one important aspect of understanding the art of
earlier times is to understand the way people per-
ceived artworks then.
The most explicit statement of this claim comes
from Heinrich Wo¨lfflin, in one of the best-known
passages in the history of art history:
Vision itself has its history, and the revelation of these
visual strata must be regarded as the primary task of art
history.2
While Wo¨lfflin’s provocative statement has be-
come an important slogan for generations of art
historians, the general idea that visionhas a history
had another major, and in some ways even more
influential, proponent in the context of the turn
of the century German/Austrian art-historical tra-
dition, namely, Alois Riegl. Riegl’s main guid-
ing principle in The Late Roman Art Industry
was that the way people perceived the world in
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ancient times is radically different from the way
we perceive now. More precisely, he argues that
ancient people sawonly “individual self-contained
shapes”—and this explains some crucial features
of their representational visual art.3 But even
within the ancient era, he hypothesizes that the
Egyptians perceived the world differently from
the way theGreeks did and theGreeks differently
from the way the Romans, especially the late Ro-
mans, did.
Perhaps the real influence of the history
of vision claim was provided by the application
of this general and abstract idea to the question of
modernity—an idea that is present in the work of
a very diverse group of thinkers: Charles Baude-
laire, Georg Simmel, Friedrich Nietzsche, La´szlo´
Moholy-Nagy, Siegfried Kracauer, and Lev Male-
vich, to mention just a few.4 But it was Walter
Benjaminwhomade this application of the history
of vision claim most explicitly and most influen-
tially. Inspired by Riegl’s general claims about the
history of vision,5 he says:
During long periods of history, themode of human sense
perception changes with humanity’s entire mode of ex-
istence. The manner in which human sense perception
is organized, the medium in which it is accomplished, is
determined not only by nature but by historical circum-
stances as well.6
Riegl’s influence is clear in these passages and es-
pecially in the ways in which Benjamin applies
these general ideas to specific periods in art his-
tory: “The period of migration in which the late
Roman art industry and the Vienna Genesis came
into being, had not only a different art, but also a
different perception from classical times.”7 Ben-
jamin’s main interest, however, is not the late
Roman art industry, but the change in art and
perception that happened at the end of the nine-
teenth and the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury. And Benjamin’s claim is that modernity is
a change in sensorium, and this idea has become
one of the guiding principles of theorizing about
modernity. For Benjamin, this change in senso-
rium was brought about by technological changes.
Not just the changes in the streetscape around us:
the speeding cars and the skyscrapers that Male-
vich and Baudelaire like to emphasize, but also
the technological changes in art itself. As Re´gis
Debray summarizes, “Photography has changed
our perception of space, and the cinema our per-
ception of time (via montage).”8
Still, the application of the idea of the his-
tory of vision does not stop, and does not be-
gin, with modernity. As Jonathan Crary argues
at length, the general mode of perception may
have undergone some important form of change
already in the first half of the nineteenth century.9
And theorists of postmodernism rely on the prin-
ciple of the history of vision as much as the-
orists of modernity do. Fredric Jameson, for
example, argues that postmodernism offers “a
whole new Utopian realm of the senses.”10 The
premise all these arguments share is that history,
and art history, can be understood, at least par-
tially, as the history of perception. This assumption
is so deeply ingrained in much of the discourse
on nineteenth- and twentieth-century art and cul-
ture and in (at least some branches of) art history
and aesthetics that it has been taken for granted
without further discussion.11 As Whitney Davis
summarized recently, “according to visual-culture
studies, it is true prima facie that vision has a
cultural history.”12 Recently, however, this con-
sensus seems to have broken down.
iii. arguments against the history of vision
The twomost influential recent arguments against
the history of vision are based on psychology. The
first one emphasizes that vision is modular: it is
not sensitive to whatever else goes on in ourmind.
Most importantly, it is not sensitive to the beliefs
we have.13 It is informationally encapsulated. A
classic demonstration of this is the Mu¨ller-Lyer il-
lusion: we know that the two lines are of the same
length, but we cannot stop ourselves from seeing
them as having different lengths. Arthur Danto
argues that if vision is in fact modular, then it
cannot be influenced by the higher order mental
processes that do change with history. Our beliefs
and knowledge do change with history, but given
that vision is not sensitive to these beliefs and
knowledge, our vision does not have a history.14
Danto adds that it is the interpretation of vision
that changes, and the interpretation of vision may
very well have a history, but vision itself does not
and cannot change.
Danto also explores another line of argument
against the history of vision claim, one that was
originally introduced by David Bordwell.15 The
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starting point of this argument is that vision
is hardwired. The way our perceptual system
functions is determined by evolution, not by cul-
tural influences. Bordwell makes this argument
with reference to the evolutionary implausibility
of the history of vision claim. His line of thought is
that if vision, something hardwired, were to have
a history, this could only be explained as Lamar-
ckian evolution—the culturally acquired changes
in our vision would be transmitted to the next
generation. But the main point of the Darwinian
explanatory scheme of evolution is that acquired
character traits are not inherited.16
These two arguments are not completely inde-
pendent from one another. The claim about the
hardwired nature of vision is often supplemented
with the insistence that there are no top-down in-
fluences on our perceptual processes.17 And this,
in turn, is intertwined with claims about the mod-
ularity of vision.
There are two ways of arguing against these
recent objections to the history of vision claim.
First, it could be pointed out that what Danto and
Bordwell mean by vision is not what Benjamin,
Jameson,Malevich, orRieglmean by vision.What
Danto and Bordwell mean is the physiological ap-
paratus that is fixed by evolution and that may
well be insensitive to our higher order mental pro-
cesses. But what Benjamin, Jameson, Malevich,
or Riegl mean is something much broader and
less restrictive. So maybe the debate is really a
terminological one. I will explore this way of re-
solving the history of vision debate in the next
section.
Second, we can engage with the arguments
of Danto and Bordwell on their own terms.
Both Danto and Bordwell assume that vision is
modular. But this is a highly controversial claim
among vision scientists—and it was already very
controversial at the time when Danto’s paper
was published.18 At some point in the 1980s, it
did appear as if there were a (fragile) consensus
among psychologists and vision scientists (and
philosophers of mind) that perception is indeed
modular, but this has become much more con-
troversial since. We now have very clear evidence
that top-down processes influence perceptual
processing as early as the primary visual cortex.19
We also know that cross-modal influences be-
tween visual and auditory perception are rife.20
These findings all militate against Danto’s main
premise: if we have no reason to believe that
vision is modular, Danto’s argument simply fails
to get off the ground.
Further, we also have strong reasons to doubt
that vision is hardwired. Recent findings about the
neural plasticity of the brain in general and of our
perceptual processes in particular show that while
muchof thewayour perceptual processes function
is in fact determined by evolution, there is a lot of
room for adjustments and changes that are part
of our developmental processes.21 Also, recent
work in philosophy of biologywarns against draw-
ing too sharp a line between innate and learned
traits.22 Bordwell’s argument onlyworks if percep-
tion is entirely innate and if we can have some very
clear way of keeping innate and learned processes
apart. But it seems that neither of these premises
is correct.
Can we then dismiss the arguments against the
history of vision completely? We may be able to
conclude that, as knock-down arguments against
the history of vision claim, they fail. But they
do need to be taken seriously inasmuch as they
demonstrate the importance of making explicit
what exactly changes from one historical era to
the other. Danto and Bordwell are right in em-
phasizing that, for example, the retinal processing
of visual stimuli is extremely unlikely to change
in the course of history. The retinal processing of
visual stimuli is, of course, only one part of the
perceptual process; the question then is: what is it
that changes if not the retinal image?What exactly
is the history of vision the history of?
iv. attempts at a compromise
I have been focusing on the recent debate between
the proponents and the opponents of the idea of
the history of vision, and on the basis of the most
important arguments in this debate it may seem
that there are only two options: vision either has
or does not have a history. But the debate in fact
has more layers.
One could try to carve out an intermediary po-
sition between the two extreme views—by argu-
ing that some aspects of vision do have a history
while some others do not. Ernst Gombrich’s Art
and Illusion could be thought to be a monumental
attempt at exactly this compromise. The overarch-
ing theme of the book is that we should not make
inferences from the way pictures of a certain era
represent to the way people of that era perceived.
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This seems like the opposite of the history of vision
claim. But Gombrich would also be unmoved by
Danto- or Bordwell-style arguments, as he is very
explicit that what we call ‘seeing’ is conditioned
by habits and expectations—top-down effects.23
As our habits and expectations can change from
one historic era to the other, he could, in princi-
ple, be open to the claim that so can our seeing.
But things are even more complicated. He makes
a distinction between vision and schemata and in-
sists that it is the schemata that changes in history,
not vision.
There are other, structurally similar attempts
at a compromise between the history of vision
claim and its straight negation. David Bordwell
himself aims to carve out such a compromisewhen
he distinguishes vision and visual skills. Vision, for
Bordwell, is constant and ahistorical, but visual
skills do change. Visual skills do have a history. In
fact, he argues that visual skills can even change
within one and the same individual. His example
is the visual skill of noticing jump cuts in films—
something people were clearly unable to do in
1895 but were capable of in 1995. Tom Gunning
makes a similar claim about the changes in our
visual skills of watching films around 1908.24
Michael Baxandall’s book Painting and Experi-
ence in Fifteenth Century Italy, which, on the face
of it, could be taken to be one of the clearest illus-
trations of the history of vision claim, also turns
out to be an example of this compromise position
on closer inspection.25 Baxandall does not say, as
for exampleRiegl orBenjamindo, that the general
“mode of vision” of people in fifteenth-century
Italy was different from our general “mode of vi-
sion.” When they saw a tree, they may have had
the very same retinal stimulation as we do. But
people in fifteenth-century Italy had some very
specific visual skills, employed when they looked
at pictures, that we do not have.Again, the general
“mode of vision” does not have a history, but the
specific visual skills involved in looking at pictures
does.
Baxandall’s concept of ‘period eye’ sums up
this compromise nicely. He explicitly engages with
the question of which aspects or stages of hu-
man vision are universal and which ones are not
universal and, as a result, subject to variations
throughout history. He takes the formation of the
retinal image to be universal, but everything that
comes after that can in principle be subject to his-
torical variations.26 Baxandall formulates this con-
trast in terms of raw data and the interpretation
of this raw data (which is, oddly, very similar to
Danto’s contrast). This choice of terms may be
somewhat controversial, as it is somewhat prob-
lematic to take the primary visual cortex to be
interpreting the retinal image, but what is impor-
tant for our purposes is that Baxandall’s concept
of ‘period eye’ could also be considered to be a
compromise between the history of vision claim
and the stance that at least some aspects of vision
are universal.
Finally, another critic of the history of vision,
Noe¨l Carroll, also makes a distinction structurally
similar to Bordwell’s between seeing and noticing
and admits that what we notice changes in the
course of history.27 But what we see does not. I
come back to this distinction in Section VI below.
v. clarifying the history of vision claim
So far, I have taken the history of vision claim
to be the following simple statement: vision has
a history. But this seemingly simple statement is
in fact ambiguous in at least two ways, and in or-
der to even attempt to reconcile the ahistorical
and the historical arguments, we need to do some
disentangling.
The first question we need to ask is what is
meant by vision, or,more generally, by perception,
in this debate. What is it that is supposed to have
a history? Sensory stimulation? The perceptual
mechanism? If so, the mechanism of early vision
or of late vision? Perceptual content? Perceptual
phenomenology?
As we have seen, the retinal processing of stim-
uli is unlikely to change in the course of history—
and it is a very far-fetched idea that this is what
Riegl, Wo¨lfflin, or Benjamin had in mind when
they talked about the history of vision. If Danto’s,
Bordwell’s, andCarroll’s claims are about the reti-
nal processing of stimuli, then this debate is a clear
case of the two camps talking past each other. The
same is true of the interpretation of vision as the
perceptual mechanism.
Is the debate about perceptual content—about
what we see? Maybe. But the concept of percep-
tual content is itself very unclear. If it means just
the object we see, then, again, the history of vision
claim is unlikely to make much sense: when the
ancient Egyptian looked at the Moon and when
I look at the Moon, in some sense, we do see the
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same thing: the object we see is the same. Is our
perceptual content the same? That depends on
how we cash out this technical notion introduced
in, and seldom used outside of, contemporary an-
alytic philosophy of mind.28 If we allow for the
way the object is perceived to be part of percep-
tual content, then we may have a more interesting
claim: the ancient Egyptian may have perceived
the Moon in a different way from the way I do.
But much of this difference may be due to the
last candidate for interpreting the history of vi-
sion claim: perceptual phenomenology.
Ultimately, I take the history of vision claim to
be about perceptual phenomenology: about what
it is like to see something—about our experiences.
This is the interpretationRiegl,Wo¨lfflin, andBen-
jamin were interested in, and this is the only in-
terpretation that cannot be dismissed as either
trivially false or ill formulated. But this inter-
pretation also makes it difficult to settle the
debate about the history of vision. Perceptual
phenomenology is by definition only accessible
to the person who has the experience. We cannot
have direct access to someone else’s perceptual
experience, and we cannot have direct access to
the perceptual experiences of people who lived
centuries ago either. I propose a way to get past
this obstacle in the next section.
The second ambiguity about the history of vi-
sion claim that is orthogonal to the first one is
the following: when we talk about the history of
vision, what is this vision the vision of? What is
the scope of perception that is supposed to have
history? All and any perception? Or the percep-
tion in a specific context? The second claim would
clearly be much easier to swallow.
There is a disagreement within the history of
vision camp about the scope of perception that is
supposed to have a history. We can distinguish the
following two claims:
a. Perception in general changes from one histor-
ical era to the other.
b. Perception in a certain specific context changes
from one historical era to the other.
The original formulation of the history of vision
claim byRiegl is a clear example for (a): according
to Riegl, ancient people saw everything as “indi-
vidual self-contained shapes.” Benjamin inherited
this more radical version (a) fromRiegl, andwhen
he understands modernity as entailing a change
in sensorium, what he means by ‘sensorium’ is
the very general mode of perceiving the world—
streets, cars, buildings, everything. It is this stance
that became dominant in more recent accounts
of the history of vision, for example, in Crary or
Jameson.
Heinrich Wo¨lfflin, in contrast, very explicitly
restricts the scope of his history of vision claim to
the perception of artworks and mainly to the per-
ception of pictures. The same is true ofBaxandall’s
account of visual perception in fifteenth-century
Italy and of Gunning’s claims about the changes
in our perception with the advent of the “cinema
of attraction” around 1908. These accounts are
versions of (b).29
I argue that the best bet for the proponents of
the history of vision claim is to opt for (b). But in
order to do so, I need to appeal to an important
concept that has been oddly ignored in aesthetics
in general and in this debate in particular: visual
attention.30
vi. the history of visual attention
We have seen that the most plausible formulation
of the history of vision claim is about visual phe-
nomenology: what changes in the course of history
is what it feels like to perceive something. My ar-
gument for the history of vision proceeds in two
steps:
1. Visual phenomenology depends systematically
on visual attention.
2. Visual attention has a history.
The concept of visual attention does not seem to
have played a significant role in the history of
vision debate. One exception is Andre´ Malraux,
who famously wrote that “the creation of every
great art is inseparable from [the] metamorphosis
in the manner of seeing, which does not properly
belong in the realm of vision, but of attention.”31
In some ways, my account could be thought of as
an elaboration of this sketchy idea Malraux men-
tions in passing. Our perception changes in the
course of history because the allocation of our vi-
sual attention changes. If wewant an argument for
the history of vision, we need to look for evidence
in favor of the history of attention.
The first premise of my argument is that vi-
sual phenomenology depends systematically on
the allocation of one’s attention. Attention, as the
famous “inattentional blindness” phenomenon
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shows, can dramatically change what we
experience.32
Probably the most famous inattentional blind-
ness experiment is the following.33 We are shown
a short video clip of two teams of three, dressed
in white and black, passing a ball around. We are
asked to count how many times the white team
passes the ball around. On first viewing, most of
the observers come up with an answer to this
not very interesting question. On second view-
ing, however, when there is no counting task to be
completed, they notice that a man dressed in a go-
rilla costume walks right in the middle of the pass-
ing game, makes funny gestures, and then leaves.
The gorilla spends nine seconds in the frame and
most viewers are not aware of it when attending
to the passing of the ball.34
Recall Carroll’s distinction between seeing and
noticing.35 He admits that what we notice changes
in the course of history. But what we see does not.
In the light of the inattentional blindness findings,
this distinction seemsodd. Seeing, in anymeaning-
ful sense of the term, presupposes noticing: what
we notice, that is, what we are attending to, sys-
tematically influences our perceptual experience.
To sum up, what these empirical and every-
day phenomena show is that attention can make a
huge difference in what we experience.36 In short,
if we can show that visual attention has a history,
we can conclude that vision has a history.
And we indeed have strong (although maybe
not foolproof) reasons to take visual attention to
have a history. I want to explore the possibility
of arguing that our visual attention changed in an
important respect in the course of the sixteenth
century.
But first, some methodological worries need to
be acknowledged. How can one argue that in a
certain historic period in the past, people exer-
cised their attention in such and such a manner?
We could use the pictures they made as evidence,
but this is always going to be partial evidence, as
Gombrich repeatedly points out. But we can also
use contemporary written evidence. I will use the
combination of the two.
There are a number of ways of attend-
ing (overt/covert, endogenous/exogenous, fo-
cused/distributed, and so on).37 The special way
of attending I want to focus on is what I call,
following Richard Wollheim, ‘twofold attention.’
The general suggestion is that sometimes we are
simultaneously attending to both the picture
surface and the represented object.38 We have a
twofold experience in this sense.39 As Richard
Wollheim puts it, “The spectator is, and re-
mains, visually aware not only of what is rep-
resented but also of the surface qualities of the
representation.”40
We need to be careful here. On the one hand,
Wollheim argues that twofoldness is a necessary
condition for perceiving pictures, that is, any pic-
ture, regardless of its aesthetic value. On the other
hand, he also talks about twofoldness as an im-
portant (maybe even necessary) feature of the
aesthetic appreciation of pictorial masterpieces.
These two ways of using the concept of twofold-
ness are clearly not the same, but Wollheim un-
fortunately uses them interchangeably. So some
disambiguation is needed. I make a distinction
between the concept of pictorial twofoldness and
the concept of appreciative twofoldness. ForWoll-
heim, it is pictorial twofoldness that is a neces-
sary condition for perceiving pictures—any pic-
ture. And appreciative twofoldness is the one that
is an important feature of the aesthetic apprecia-
tion of pictorial masterpieces.
Part of the confusion between these two ways
of using the concept of twofoldness stems from
the ambiguity in Wollheim’s use of the concept
of awareness when talking about twofoldness as
simultaneous awareness of the picture surface
and the depicted scene.41 If what is meant by
awareness here is conscious attention (as Woll-
heim sometimes explicitly suggests), then it is ex-
tremely implausible that the resulting concept of
twofoldness could serve as a necessary condition
for perceiving pictures—we do not usually pay
much conscious attention to the features of the
picture surface when we leaf through a magazine
or watch sitcoms on the plane.42 But we do, ar-
guably, have such twofold attention (in the sense
of appreciative twofoldness) when we are admir-
ing masterpieces and of how certain brushstrokes
contribute to the depicted scene. This is the sense
of twofoldness, that is, appreciative twofoldness,
that Wollheim uses when he makes claims such
as “in Titian, in Vermeer, in Manet we are led
to marvel endlessly at the way in which line or
brushstroke or expanse of colour is exploited to
render effects or establish analogies that can only
be identified representationally.”43
The claim that is important from thepurposes of
this article is the appreciative twofoldness claim,
which emphasizes the importance of twofold
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attention. While not everyone agrees that twofold
attention is a necessary feature of the aesthetic
appreciation of pictures, it seems to be agreed on
that twofold attention, or as Malcolm Budd put
it, attending to “the interrelationship between the
marks on the surface andwhat is depicted in them”
is a “crucial characteristic of pictorial art.”44 My
topic here is not the explanatory relevance or im-
portance of this concept but its history.
If I am looking at an apple and I am attending
to its color and if I am looking at the same apple
and I am attending to its shape, the phenome-
nal character of my experience will be different.
In other words, what properties one is attending
to makes a difference in one’s perceptual phe-
nomenology. The problem is that it is difficult to
see what evidence we could find that would show
that visual attention has changed in the course of
history. Some obviously faulty lines of reasoning
need to be put aside. There were no traffic lights
in theMiddle Ages, so people then could not have
attended to traffic lights. Now we do have traffic
lights, and sometimes we are attending to them.
This difference will not give us any reason to think
that attention has a history in the relevant sense—
if the scene in front of us is different, then it is
obvious that our attention will work differently.
This would not give us any meaningful version of
the history of vision claim: if all that is meant by
the history of vision claim is that we see traffic
lights now, but we have not seen traffic lights in
the Middle Ages, then the history of vision claim
would hardly be something worth arguing about.
For us to be able to infer a change in percep-
tual phenomenology from a change in attention,
we need to be able to point at two cases where
the visual scene in front of us is the same, but
our attention is exercised differently. The inatten-
tional blindness experiments used the same con-
trast: the visual scene when watching the gorilla
video is the same—we see the very same footage.
But, because we are attending differently, our vi-
sual phenomenology is different.
Thus, in order to be able to argue that attention
has changed in the course of history, we would
need to be able to show that the very same visual
scene was differently attended to in different his-
toric periods.
This general explanatory scheme seems to be
easier to apply in the case of the life history of
one single person. Suppose that a year ago I did
not know anything about trees, but then I took
an intensive course on botany. Now compare my
visual experience of a pine tree a year ago and my
visual experience of the very same pine tree (seen
from the same angle, in the same lighting condi-
tions) now. Given that I have familiarized myself
with various features of pine trees, when I see the
pine tree now, I am likely to attend to different
features than the ones I attended to a year ago. I
now attend to, say, the shape of the pine cones, the
color of the foliage, the diversity of the ways the
needles are bundled in fascicles, and so on. I did
not attend to any of these features a year ago, as I
did not know much about any of them: I was just
looking at a tree without knowing much about the
specifics of pine trees. Thus, I am attending to dif-
ferent things now, and, as a result, the argument
goes, my perceptual phenomenology is also differ-
ent. At least in my own life history, it seems that
my attention (when it comes to pine trees) does
have a history, and as a result, so does my vision.
The question is whether we can generalize the
structure of the argument in this example to his-
tory per se (as opposed to one’s own personal
history). And the answer is not at all straightfor-
ward. While we have strong reasons to suppose
that I am now attending to features of the pine
tree that I was not in the position to attend to
in the past, we do not generally have any rea-
son to suppose that there are features of an ob-
ject that in some past periods people were not
in the position to attend to—it is hard to see what
evidencewe could have that would show howpeo-
ple were attending to a certain kind of object in
the Middle Ages, for example.
Here is a potential example that may at first
seem tempting in this context. There was a time
when people did not know that the Moon is a
spherical object and the changes in its phases re-
sult from the way in which the Sun illuminates it.
These people then were looking at the same ob-
ject as the one we are looking at now, but they
were not in the position to see, for example, the
dark side of the Moon. So, the argument would
go, we are attending to different features of the
Moon (for example, the line between the shadow
it casts upon itself and the sunlit parts) from the
one these people in the distant past could possibly
attend to. And, as a result, our perceptual phe-
nomenology is different from theirs. I am skepti-
cal that such an argument would be successful, as
I am skeptical that this difference in attention is
significant enough to bring about a difference in
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perceptual phenomenology. One could argue that
these people in the distant past could also attend
to the same visual feature of theMoon (that is, the
curved line between the visible and the invisible
part of the Moon), but they referred to it, or con-
ceptualized it, differently. So this difference is not
really a difference in visual attention, but rather
a difference in the way we conceptualize what we
see (and attend to).
In short, I am skeptical of such a general way
of arguing that the features of objects we attend
to changed in the course of history (although I
do not want to fully exclude this possibility). But
I will argue that we may have more reasons to
suppose that there was a change in what features
of pictures we are attending to.
More precisely, we may have good reasons to
suppose that attention, at least attention as exer-
cised when looking at pictures, has a history. But
then, as attention systematically influences per-
ceptual phenomenology, so does vision. The more
specific claim I want to explore is that twofold at-
tention has a history. We can and do now attend
to the relation between features of the picture sur-
face and features of the depicted scenewhen look-
ing at pictures. And often in order to appreciate
a picture aesthetically, we need to exercise our at-
tention this way. But there may have been periods
when people did not attend this way.
We have clear evidence that people were capa-
ble of twofold attention by the middle of the six-
teenth century, at least in Western Europe, which
is the region I focus on from now on (more on
whether I am entitled to do so below). A well-
known example of this is the attention to bravura
brushwork found in works by the later Titian and
widely appreciated by his contemporaries. The
appreciation of bravura brushwork is a form of
appreciation that demands both attention to the
thing represented and to the particular way in
which a loose set of marks on the surface has been
employed to bring about that representation.
But there are other examples from around the
middle of the sixteenth century. Awidespread and
very popular subgenre of paintings in that cen-
tury could only be fully appreciated by attending
to both the picture surface and the depicted ob-
ject. The best-known representative of this sub-
genre is Giuseppe Arcimboldo, whose portraits
can only be appreciated by exercising twofold at-
tention: in order to see the mastery of the ex-
ecution, we need to be able to attend to the
very same specific marks on the surface as both
depicting a fruit and as the design feature–we can,
of course, see the depicted person in the paint-
ing (and also the depicted fruits) without twofold
attention, but we could not appreciate the mas-
tery of the execution of it depicting both (and
depicting one by depicting the other). Without
being able to identify the very same surface fea-
ture as responsible for both, we could not appreci-
ate this genre of paintings. Although Arcimboldo
is the best-known representative of this way of
composing pictures, the so-called ‘anthropomor-
phic landscapes’ were widespread from the sec-
ond half of the sixteenth century, especially in the
Low Countries.45 In these paintings, we see the
marks on the surface in two ways: both as de-
picting various elements of the landscape—cows,
walls, shrubbery—and as depicting parts of a hu-
man face—eyes, nose, beard. To do so, we need to
attend to the features of the picture surface and
to the features of the depicted objects (that is, the
depicted cows and the depicted eyes) simultane-
ously. It is important that the simultaneity in ques-
tion is not the simultaneity of seeing themarks as a
face and seeing the marks as a landscape. We can,
and often do, flip back and forth between these
two ways of seeing the painting (as we flip back
and forth when we are looking at the duck–rabbit
drawing). The point is that we would not be able
to appreciate themastery of the execution of these
paintings (for example, why the small cow in the
background is placed where it is placed) without
attending to the relation between the features of
the surface and the features of the two depicted
scenes. Appreciation here presupposes twofold
attention.
But these “anthropomorphic landscapes” are
not the only indication of the capacity of sixteenth-
century people to exercise twofold attention.
Wo¨lfflin spends quite some time describing the
importance of the relation between the surface
features and the depicted scene when seeing
and appreciating some sixteenth-century paint-
ings. One of his examples is Leonardo’s Last Sup-
per, where the alternating black and white of the
receding side walls serves as a way of grouping
the characters in the foreground.46 Here, a formal
element of the surface (provided by the depicted
side walls) is essential for the pictorial organiza-
tion of the apostles in the foreground. The appre-
ciation of these features presupposes the exercise
of twofold attention, which makes it possible to
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see the surface feature of the alternating black
and white of the receding side walls as interact-
ing with the depicted scene’s three-dimensional
pictorial organization.
A last example: in Rafael’s The Expulsion
of Heliodorus, as Richard Wollheim (following,
again, Wo¨lfflin) points out, the fall of Heliodorus
on the right is counterbalanced by the boys climb-
ing up a column on the left. And to make things
even more complex, it is this interaction between
the upward movement in the left and downward
movement on the right that draws our attention
to the middle of the composition, to the praying
high priest in the background.47 Here, we need to
have twofold attention to both the surface and the
depicted scene in order to be able to appreciate
the ways in which the two interact to guide our
attention to the middle of the picture.
In short, people in the middle of the sixteenth
centurywere already capable of twofold attention.
But were people in earlier times, importantly, in
the centuries immediately preceding the sixteenth
century, incapable of it?48 This claim is obviously
difficult to establish and it is important to note
that it would be a methodological mistake to ap-
peal exclusively to the way pictures depicted their
objects in that period.While itmay be true that the
appreciation of fourteenth-century pictures does
not necessarily require twofold attention (the way
some post-sixteenth-century paintings do) and it
may even be true that the appreciation of these
pictures requires that the viewer ignore the way
the picture surface is organized. But we cannot
infer facts about vision from facts about picto-
rial representations—something Gombrich likes
to emphasize.49
One preliminary consideration comes from the
relatively sudden emergence of artworks that ac-
tively rely on twofold attention in the middle of
the sixteenth century. In, say, 1560, many different
pictures of different genre and kindwere explicitly
made in away that they could only be aesthetically
appreciated with the help of twofold attention.
But a couple of decades before that thiswas true of
no pictures. This sudden onset of pictures that pre-
suppose twofold attention and the fact that very
different kinds of pictures that rely on twofold at-
tention emerged about the same time point to a
sudden change in the way people exercised their
attention. But, as I emphasized, this is at best a
suggestive piece of data, not a real argument.
But here is a real argument. Alberti’s De Pic-
tura contains a lengthy analysis of compositio:
what we would now call pictorial organization.50
The compositio of pictures, according to Alberti,
consists of organizing planes to members, mem-
bers to bodies, bodies to pictures (or to historia).
This organization of elements into higher units has
its rules: for example, according toAlberti, atmost
nine elements should be organized into the higher
unit, there should be a certain degree of variety
between the elements, and so on. Michael Baxan-
dall compared Alberti’s concept of pictorial com-
positio to the humanist concept of compositio in
rhetoric (that Alberti, like any educated quattro-
cento Italian, would have been very much aware
of): organizing words into phrases, phrases into
clauses, clauses into sentences.51
What is interesting for our purposes is that pic-
torial compositio in Alberti’s sense is entirely a
matter of the depicted scene. The basic unit of
pictorial compositio is the plane: the surface of de-
picted objects. Not the pigment, that is, the mark
on the surface, but something that is depicted.
Thus, the equivalent of words, which serves as the
basic units of rhetorical compositio is, in the case
of pictorial compositio, part of the depicted scene.
For Alberti, in other words, pictorial compositio
is fully in the domain of what is depicted—the
picture surface seems to play no essential role in
pictorial compositio. That is, for Alberti, picto-
rial organization does not require anything akin
to twofold attention—it is exclusively a matter of
the depicted scene. Attention to the surface is en-
tirely missing.
A further consideration in favor of the claim
that we have no evidence that before the sixteenth
century Western observers exercised twofold at-
tention when looking at pictures comes from
Michael Baxandall, who analyzes at length the
various visual skills that fifteenth-century Italian
(educated) observers exercised when looking at
paintings.52 Not one of these visual skills concerns
the surface of the painting. In short, we have no
reason to suppose that the fifteenth-century Ital-
ian (educated) observers attended to the proper-
ties of the picture surface. But then they did not
exercise twofold attention either, as this would
presuppose attending to the surface (as well as to
the depicted scene).
Onemayobject that (paceBaxandall) fifteenth-
century Italian (educated) observers did attend
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to at least some features of the surface, namely,
what it is made of: they did attend to the quantity
and quality of ultramarine and gold used on the
picture, and this is not a feature of the depicted
scene, but of the picture surface. While this is un-
deniable, note that attending to these features of
the surface is not in the position to give rise to
twofold attention as I defined this term above.
Remember that twofold attention means attend-
ing to the relation between scene and surface. But
attending to the quality and quantity of the ultra-
marine is not attention to the design features of
the surface that are responsible for depicting the
represented scene.53 The quality and quantity of
ultramarine is like the cracks in the paint in this
respect. The awareness of the quality and quan-
tity of ultramarine, like the cracks in the paint,
does not contribute to our awareness of the de-
picted scene.Thus, attending to themmaybe an in-
stance of surface attention, but it will not be an in-
stance of twofold attention—they do not count as
counterexamples.
These considerations may demonstrate that we
do not have any evidence that fifteenth-century
Italians did not exercise twofold attention. But of
course the absence of evidence is not an evidence
of absence: I did not give any positive evidence
for the claim that fifteenth-century Italians did
not attend this way. The following argument is
supposed to take us a step closer to this positive
claim.
One striking aspect of pre-sixteenth-century
paintings is the enormous effort painters made
in order to avoid occlusion.54 If they depict, say,
twelve people in one picture, it happens very
rarely that any of these twelve is depicted even
partially occluded (one exception is the represen-
tation of nondescript crowds, where occlusion is
used). And if a table is depicted with lots of food
items and utensils and tools on it, each of the tools
and utensils and food items is fully in view: not be-
hind or in front of some other object. This changes
quickly in the sixteenth century (especially quickly
in the genre of food-related still lives), whenocclu-
sion was not avoided at all. This avoidance of oc-
clusion is remarkably systematic and a very salient
feature of pre-sixteenth-century pictures (and, cu-
riously, also of pictures made by children under
five).
Now the argument is the following. Suppose, for
reductio, that people in the fifteenth century did
exercise twofold attention: they attended to the
features of the surface and of the depicted scene
at the same time: they attended to the relation be-
tween surface features and scene features. If they
really did so, they would have experienced these
pictures as depicting extremely unlikely scenes:
ones that are arranged in a special way such that
no one occludes anyone else. As this almost never
happens in real life and given the amount of tech-
nical skill geared toward the avoidance of oc-
clusion, experiencing the depicted scene as very
unlikely seems to be a very salient feature of
the way these fifteenth-century observers expe-
rienced pictures. But as we have no reason to
suppose that the unlikely nature of the scene was
ever part of the fifteenth-century experience of
pictures, let alone a salient part thereof, we have
reason to deny the supposition for reductio—that
people in the fifteenth century exercised twofold
attention.
We can now (tentatively) conclude that while
people in Western Europe exercised twofold at-
tentionwhen looking at pictures in the second half
of the sixteenth century, we have no evidence that
they did so a century earlier. Attention, at least at-
tention exercised in the case of looking at pictures,
seems to have changed significantly sometime
in the sixteenth century. Attention does have a
history.
It is important to clarify the scope of this claim.
Whose attention is it that is at stake here? I was
exclusively talking about (educated) observers
mainly in Italy—should we restrict my claim to
that group? So is it the case that my argument re-
ally only supports a much more qualified claim,
namely, that the attention of Italian humanist ob-
servers has a history? I do not think so. While
the evidence for the exercise of twofold atten-
tion in the sixteenth century may be limited to a
smallish part of the world—to Western Europe—
it is important to note that this is supposed to
serve as an illustration. Because we have a rel-
atively rich body of sources about the ways in
which people were thinking about pictures in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries from Western
Europe, we can localize this potential emergence
of twofold attention relatively accurately. In the
case of other parts of the world, we do not have
sufficient sources to make similar claims. But it
would be an interesting and important research
project to establish when a similar transition
took place (if it did) in the case of non-Western
observers.
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Further, it is important to note the differ-
ence between this proposal and Marx Wartof-
sky’s, according to which the “dimensionality” of
space perception changed some time in the fif-
teenth century as a result of the invention of
perspective.55 Following the distinction between
two different history of vision claims with very
different scope I made in Section V, we can say
that Wartofsky’s proposal is an example of the
history of vision claim (a), where the sensorium
in general changes—according to Wartofsky—
because of the innovation in depictive techniques,
whereas my proposal is an example of the his-
tory of vision claim (b), where I only argue that
the attention to (and, as a result, perceptual
phenomenologyof seeing) pictures changed.Also,
the change Wartofsky talks about was supposed
to take place about a hundred years before the
change I am focusing on.
A final clarification, still on the scope of my
claim: I argued that we have no evidence that ed-
ucated Italians in the fifteenth century exercised
twofold attention when looking at pictures. It is
important to emphasize that this claim does not
imply that they were incapable of doing so. Pre-
sumably, they were. And some of them, namely,
the artists themselves, did have to pay attention
to the features of the picture surface when they
were making marks on them that were supposed
to give rise to the visual experience of the depicted
scene. Artists of all ages, arguably, have to exer-
cise twofold attention in order to be able to make
marks on the surface that are seen as depictions of
three dimensional scenes. But my claim excludes
the artists (at least artists at the moment of depict-
ing something). My claim is that we have no evi-
dence that those people (in the fifteenth century)
who were looking at pictures were encouraged or
required to attend in a twofold manner.
It may seem odd that I said nothing about what
may or may not have triggered this change in the
way we are looking at pictures. And I do want
to remain neutral about this here. One possibil-
ity, explored at length by Whitney Davis, is that it
is the exposure of different kinds of images that
changes our way of looking at images (and, in
the light of my proposal, changes our way of at-
tending to them), resulting in a cyclical/dynamic
process.56 While this proposal is consistent with
my argument here, my argument does not presup-
pose this way of looking at the history of vision
claim.
I need to emphasize that this change in the his-
tory of visual attention has a very limited scope:
it only applies to visual attention exercised in the
case of seeing pictures. As a result, the conclusion
for the history of vision debatewill also have a sim-
ilarly limited scope. Our general “mode of vision”
(in the sense of Riegl or Benjamin) may or may
not have a history. But our perception of pictures
does have a history. As our practice of allocating
visual attention when looking at pictures changed
in the sixteenth century and as visual phenomenol-
ogy systematically depends on visual attention, we
can conclude that our visual experience of look-
ing at pictures changed in the sixteenth century.
This is a modest version of the history of vision
claim, but hopefully one that can bring the two
sides of the history of vision debate closer to one
another.57
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